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CRIMINAL LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the survey period, from August 1, 1989 to July 31, 1990, New
Mexico appellate courts used common rules of statutory construction to
decide several criminal cases. Part II of this article analyzes six of these
cases and divides them into two categories: the definition of terms, and
the interpretation of essential elements of a given offense. Part II.A.
discusses: (1) whether a soft drink vending machine is a structure for
purposes of the New Mexico burglary statute;' (2) whether the motor
vehicle code considers a snowmobile a vehicle; 2 and (3) whether a criminal
sentence includes the defendant's time served. 3 Part II.B. examines: (1)
whether escape is a continuing offense; 4 (2) whether a criminal solicitation
5
is perpetrated when no communication is perfected; and (3) whether a
when the
defendant committed forgery, rather than attempted forgery,
6
intended victim refused to accept the forged instrument.
Part III of this article looks at five cases arising out of DWI citations.
The first two cases follow the evolution of the interpretation of the Fresh
Pursuit Act by the New Mexico Supreme Court. 7 The third case discusses
whether the warrant requirement in the Implied Consent Act applies to
blood-alcohol tests taken for medical purposes.' The fourth case discusses
a minor's right to a jury trial. 9 Finally, the fifth case discusses whether a10
district court has discretion to impound a vehicle driven by a drunk driver.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF TERMS AND ELEMENTS
During the survey year, New Mexico appellate courts defined terms and
elements of various crimes within New Mexico's criminal statutes. These
cases can be divided into two categories. In one category of cases, the
appellate courts provided definitions for particular words within a statute.
In another category of cases, the courts performed statutory construction.
II.

Particular Terms Within Criminal Statutes Defined
The New Mexico Court of Appeals recently examined the definitions of
terms found in burglary," motor vehicle, 12 and sentencing 13 statutes.
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1. Definition of "Structure"
Burglary is "the unauthorized entry of any vehicle, watercraft, aircraft,
dwelling or other structure, movable or immovable, with the intent to
commit any felony or theft therein. 14 In State v. Bybee, 5 the court of
appeals interpreted the word "structure" as it is used in the burglary
statute.
The authorities charged Bybee with three counts of burglary of soft
drink vending machines located outside a store.1 6 Bybee entered into a
plea agreement with the prosecution in which Bybee pled nolo contendere
to one count of burglary and the prosecution dismissed the remaining
two counts of burglary.' 7 Bybee, however, specifically reserved the right
to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the burglary
charges. 8
On appeal, Bybee raised the issue of whether the definition of "structure" as used in the burglary statute includes soft drink vending machines.' 9 The court of appeals determined that the legislature did not
intend for the term "structure" to include all spaces within constructed
items. 20 Thus, the court refused to allow the term "structure" to include
soft drink vending machines located outside a store. Accordingly, the
court reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss
the burglary charges. 2'
The court of appeals based its decision on two principles. First, the
court examined legislative intent. The court noted that the burglary statute
expands the common law offense of burglary by including structures
other than dwellings within the statute's reach. 22 The court refused,
however, to expand the reach of the burglary statute to include unlawful
entry into soft drink vending machines located outside a building or other
structure. The court concluded that the legislature's modification of common law burglary did not contemplate that a vending machine alone
23
could be a structure.

The second principle the court relied on in making its decision was
the rule of construction that criminal statutes must be construed strictly
against the state. 24 Strict construction of criminal statutes prevents the
courts from enlarging or amending statutes. 25 Only the legislature may
include specific objects or places under the proscription of the burglary

14. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1984) (emphasis added).
15. 109 N.M. 44, 781 P.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1989).

16. Id.
17. Id.

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at
21. Id. at
22. Id. at
23. Id. at
24. Id. at
25. Id. at
688 P.2d 31,

46, 781
44, 781
45, 781
46, 781
45, 781
47, 781
33 (Ct.

P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
App.

at 318.
at 316.
at 317.
at 318.
at 317.
at 319; see also Varos v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 101 N.M. 713, 715,
1984).
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statute.26 Therefore, if vending machines outside a building or structure
bounds of the burglary statute, the legislature must
are to fall within the
27
amend the statute.

2. Definition of "Motor Vehicle"
In State v. Eden, 28 the court of appeals interpreted the term "motor
vehicle" in the Motor Vehicle Code by examining legislative intent and
applying principles of statutory construction. Eden was driving a snowmobile on a forest road in the Jemez Mountains when he hit a trailer
hitched to a pickup truck. 29 The impact sent the snowmobile flying.30
skier.3 The accident
When the snowmobile landed, it hit a cross-country
32
seriously injured and disfigured the skier.
At trial, the jury found Eden guilty of one count of causing great
bodily harm with a motor vehicle and one count of reckless operation
of a snowmobile.33 On appeal, in attacking the jury's conviction on the
count of great bodily harm with a motor vehicle, Eden argued that a
snowmobile is not a motor vehicle within the meaning of the Motor
Vehicle Code because a snowmobile may not be legally operated on a
New Mexico highway. 4 The court of appeals agreed with Eden and
for the crime of causing great bodily injury
reversed Eden's conviction
35
with a motor vehicle.
In reversing Eden's conviction of causing great bodily harm with a
motor vehicle, the court pointed out that the crime is part of the Motor
Vehicle Code.36 The court then examined the Motor Vehicle Code's

26. Ruiz, 109 N.M. at 47, 781 P.2d at 319.
27. Id. In rejecting the notion that the term "structure" included soft drink vending machines
located outside a building, the court noted that the power to define crimes is a legislative function
and penal statutes must be strictly construed. Id. at 46, 781 P.2d at 318. The court then applied
the rule that "[dJoubts about the construction of a criminal statute are resolved in favor of the
rule of lenity." Id. (citing State v. Keith, 102 N.M. 462, 697 P.2d 145 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
102 N.M. 492, 697 P.2d 492 (1985)).
28. 108 N.M. 737, 779 P.2d 114 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 681, 777 P.2d 1325 (1989).
29. Id. at 738, 779 P.2d at 115.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. The prosecution introduced evidence and testimony at trial indicating that Eden was
driving the snowmobile while intoxicated. Id. at 739, 779 P.2d at 116. Eden contended that the
trial court improperly admitted the results of the breath alcohol test given to him on the day of
the accident shortly after he was arrested. Id. at 742, 779 P.2d at 119. The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's admission of the breath test results as evidence of reckless operation of
a snowmobile. Id. at 743, 779 P.2d at 120 (citing State v. Watkins, 104 N.M. 561, 724 P.2d 769
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 104 N.M. 632, 725 P.2d 832 (1986)).
34. Id. at 738-39, 779 P.2d at 115-16. Snowmobiles are primarily used for off-road recreational
purposes. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-9-1 to -13 (RepL. Pamp. 1987); Vandolsen v. Constructors,
Inc., 101 N.M. 109, 114, 678 P.2d 1184, 1189 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 77, 687 P.2d
705 (1984).
35. Eden, 108 N.M. at 739, 779 P.2d at 116. The court affirmed Eden's conviction on the
count of reckless driving of a snowmobile. Id.
36. Id. The crime of causing great bodily injury with a motor vehicle is the injuring of a human
being in the unlawful operation of a motor vehicle. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-101(B) (Repl. Pamp.
1987).
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definitions of "motor vehicle ' 3 7 and "vehicle" 3 and considered these
definitions in light of the legislature's intent in imposing criminal liability
for causing great bodily injury with a motor vehicle. 3 9 Because the definition of "vehicle" limits vehicles to devices used upon a highway, the
court concluded that the legislature intended to -define a "device typically
and lawfully used upon a highway to transport persons and property." 4
The court next addressed the relationship between snowmobiles and
highway operation. Snowmobiles are not a part of the Motor Vehicle
Code because snowmobiles are governed by the Snowmobile Act. 4' Under
the Snowmobile Act, a snowmobile may not be operated on any limited
access highway or freeway at any time.4 2 The court concluded that the
legislature's choice of language in the Motor Vehicle Code, together with
the enactment of the Snowmobile Act, evidenced a legislative intent that
a snowmobile not be considered a motor vehicle for the purpose of
fulfilling the elements of the felony crime of causing great bodily harm
4
with a motor vehicle. 1
3. Definition of "Sentence"
In State v. Ruiz, 44 the court of appeals examined the intent of the legislature
and applied principles of statutory construction to the Sentencing Statute. 45
Ruiz was convicted of battery on a peace officer and resisting arrest.4 The
district court later found that Ruiz was a habitual offender. 4 After suspensions and enhancements," the district court sentenced Ruiz to one year
in prison, but granted Ruiz credit for two days of presentence confinement. 49
The court ordered that Ruiz's sentence be served in the Chaves County
Detention Center, a county jail.50 The state appealed the sentence, contending

37. "'[Mlotor vehicle' means every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is
propelled by electric power obtained from batteries or from overhead trolley wires, but not operated
upon rails." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4(B)(39) (Repl. Pamp. 1989); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. §
66-9-9 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
38. '"[V]ehicle' means every device in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be
transported or drawn upon a highway, including any frame, chassis or body of any vehicle or
motor vehicle, except devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or
tracks." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4(B)(74) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
39. Eden, 108 N.M. at 739, 779 .P.2d at 116.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 740, 779 P.2d at 117.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 741, 779 P.2d at 118. The prosecution was limited to the Snowmobile Act's provision
for a petty misdemeanor when a snowmobile has been operated recklessly. Id. at 740-41, 779 P.2d
at 117-18. Thus, in defining a term within a statute, the court again opted for a rule of lenity
because the court excluded snowmobiles from the operation of the Motor Vehicle Code.
44. 109 N.M. 437, 786 P.2d 51 (Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 436, 786 P.2d 50,
cert. denied, 109 N.M. 419, 785 P.2d 1038 (1990).
45. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
46. Ruiz, 109 N.M. at 437, 786 P.2d at 51.
47. Id.
48. Ruiz's initial sentence was eighteen months for the battery and six months for resisting
arrest. Id. The court suspended these sentences. Id. The court, however, was required under the
habitual offender statute to enhance the sentence for the battery by one year. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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that the district court did not have the authority to order Ruiz's sentence
to be served in a county jail because the sentence was for one year." Ruiz
52
contended that his sentence was for only 363 days.
The parties' dispute concerning the length of Ruiz's sentence was significant
because, under the New Mexico Sentencing Guidelines, the district court
must sentence a defendant to a corrections facility, not a county jail, if
the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one or more
years. 3 The court of appeals construed the Sentencing Statute according to
its plain meaning, holding that Ruiz's sentence was the one-year term imposed
by the judgment of the district court, not the 363 days remaining to be
served after the judge credited the sentence with the two days of presentence
confinement 4
The court's decision was based, first, on the district court's judgment,
which read "the sentence ... is suspended except for one (1) year .... ""
Second, the court looked at the statutory scheme. The terminology of the
statutory provisions regarding time credit does not suggest that credit for
presentence confinement alters a sentence. Rather, the statute authorizing
time credit states that "[a] person . . . shall, upon conviction . . . be given
credit for the period spent in presentence confinement against any sentence... .- 17 Thus, this language suggested to the court that a sentence
remains unaltered by presentence confinement credit.5" In Ruiz's case, the
trial court sentenced him to one year. The court of appeals held that the
part of the court's judgment and sentence directing that Ruiz serve his
sentence in a county jail was contrary to the law.5 9 The court of appeals
6
remanded the case to the district court for entry of an amended sentence. 0
B. Statutory Elements of Crimes
New Mexico appellate courts examined the statutory elements of the crimes
of assisting escape, 6' criminal solicitation, 62 and forgeryO during the survey
period.

51. Id. at 438, 786 P.2d at 52.
52. Id. Ruiz calculated his sentence by subtracting the two days of presentence confinement
from 365 days (one year).
53. Id.
54. Id.Ruiz argued that the Sentencing Guidelines were ambiguous and thus the court of appeals
should apply the rule of lenity when construing the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. (citation omitted).
The court of appeals determined that the Sentencing Guidelines could be construed according to
their plain meaning and thus were not ambiguous. Id. Therefore, in this situation the rule of lenity
did not apply.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-12 (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
57. Ruiz, 109 N.M. at 438, 786 P.2d at 52 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-12 (Repl. Pamp.
1987)) (emphasis added).
58. Id. The court compared the presentence confinement language to the language in the habitual
offender statute. The court noted that the habitual offender statute specifically states that the sentence
is to be changed. The presentence confinement statute, however, states that the offender shall be
given credit; it does not alter the length of the sentence. Id.
59. Id. at 439, 786 P.2d at 53.
60. Id.
61. See infra notes 64-81 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 82-107 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 108-40 and accompanying text.
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1. Assisting Escape
On July 4, 1987, Jimmy Kinslow, William Wayne Gilbert, and David B.
Gallegos escaped from the New Mexico State Penitentiary' Three weeks
after the escape, Gallegos contacted his brother-in-law, Christopher Martinez. 65 At the request of Gallegos, Martinez travelled to Santa Fe, picked
up the three escapees, and drove them to Albuquerque. 66 Martinez continued
to assist the three escapees for several days by giving them food and driving
them to various motels in Albuquerque. 67 After a few days, Kinslow took
Martinez's car without notice and left the other escapees in Albuquerque. 6
Soon thereafter, Martinez borrowed a car and drove Gilbert and Gallegos
to California. 69 Eventually, the California authorities arrested Martinez and
70
each of the three escapees.
Martinez was charged with two counts of harboring and aiding a felon
and three counts of assisting escape. 71 A jury found Martinez guilty of
the three counts of assisting escape. 72 Martinez appealed his conviction
for assisting escape on the ground that he had no involvement in the
7
actual escape from the penitentiary. 1
According to New Mexico's Uniform Jury Instructions, the elements
of the crime of assisting escape are: (1) a prisoner was in custody or
confinement; (2) a prisoner escaped; (3) the defendant aided the escape
of the prisoner; and (4) the event occurred in New Mexico. 74 The issue
.the court faced was whether a charge of assisting escape is proper against
a person who assists an inmate after the inmate has broken out of
confinement, but while the inmate is still hiding from law enforcement
7

authorities .

The court of appeals' decision hinged on whether the offense of escape
is a continuing offense. 76 If escape ends at the prison door, or when a
prisoner successfully eludes immediate pursuit or reaches temporary sanctuary, then the crime of assisting escape cannot apply to a person who

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
counts
73.
74.

State v. Martinez, 109 N.M. 34, 35, 781 P.2d 306, 307 (Ct. App. 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. At the end of the trial, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of Martinez on two
of harboring or aiding a felon. Id.
Id.
N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIM. 14-2224. Assisting escape consists of:
A. intentionally aiding any person confined or held in lawful custody or confinement
to escape; or
B. any officer, jailer or other employee, intentionally permitting any prisoner in
his custody to escape.
Whoever commits the crime of assisting escape is guilty of a third degree felony.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-11 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
75. Martinez, 109 N.M. at 36, 781 P.2d at 308.
76. Id. at 37, 781 P.2d at 309. Escape as a continuing offense means that escape commences
when an inmate flees from lawful custody or confinement and continues until the inmate is
apprehended or surrenders. Id.
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later aids an escapee.77 If the crime of escape continues for so long as
the escapee voluntarily remains at large, however, then the crime of
assisting escape is also for so long as the escapee remains at large.
In State v. Martinez, the court of appeals held that New Mexico's
escape statute constitutes a continuing offense.7 8 In reaching its decision,
79
the court considered the plain language of the escape statute, the seriousness of escape, and the clear legislative purpose of deterring escape
as support for the court's conclusion that escape constitutes a continuing
offense. 0 Once the court supported its holding that escape is a continuing
offense in New Mexico, the court easily found that an individual who
intentionally helps a person avoid recapture, when he knows the person
he is helping has escaped from lawful custody, may properly be charged
with the offense of assisting escape."1
2. Criminal Solicitation
James Cotton was arrested and charged with multiple counts of criminal
sexual penetration of a minor and criminal sexual contact with his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter.12 While awaiting trial in jail, Cotton told two
other inmates that he wished to persuade his stepdaughter not to testify
against him.8 3 Cotton also wrote several letters to his wife in Indiana in
which he discussed his strategy for his defense of the criminal charges
against him.8 4 In particular, on September 23, 1987, Cotton wrote a letter
to his wife requesting her to persuade his stepdaughter not to testify at
his trial.8 5 He gave this letter to his cell mate for mailing.8 6 The cell

77. Id. at 36, 781 P.2d at 308.
78. Id. at 37, 781 P.2d at 309.
79. The text of the escape statute provides:
Escape from a penitentiary consists of any person who shall have been lawfully
committed to the state penitentiary:
A. escaping or attempting to escape from such penitentiary; or
B. escaping or attempting to escape from any other lawful place of custody or
confinement although not actually within the confines of the penitentiary.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-9 (Supp. 1990).
80. Martinez, 109 N.M. at 37-38, 781 P.2d at 309-10. The court also supported its decision by
pointing out that the commentary to New Mexico's jury instruction for duress as a defense in an
escape case provides that the defendant must make a good faith effort to surrender or return to
custody as soon as the claimed duress has lost its coercive force. Id. at 37, 781 P.2d at 309. The
commentary to N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIM. 14-2224 cites a United States Supreme Court
decision, United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980), in which the Supreme Court states that
escape from federal custody is a continuing offense. The New Mexico Court of Appeals determined
that this citation to United States v. Bailey must be an indication that escape is a continuing offense
in New Mexico. Martinez, 109 N.M. at 37, 781 P.2d at 309.
81. Martinez, 109 N.M. at 37, 781 P.2d at 309. The court dismissed Martinez's argument that
the appropriate charge for the crime he committed was harboring or aiding a felon. Id. at 37-38,
781 P.2d at 309-10.
82. State v. Cotton, 109 N.M. 769, 770, 790 P.2d 1050, 1051 (Ct. App. 1990).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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mate, however, gave this letter to law enforcement authorities. 7 Thus,
no one mailed the original letter to Cotton's wife.
Similarly, between September 24 and 26, 1987, Cotton wrote another
letter to his wife.88 In this letter Cotton again urged his wife to talk the
stepdaughter out of testifying against him. 9 Cotton was released on bail
on September 28, 1987, but the authorities arrested him twenty-four hours
later on charges of criminal solicitation 9° and conspiracy. 9' At the time
of the rearrest, law enforcement officers found the second letter in
92
Cotton's car.
A jury convicted Cotton on two counts of criminal solicitation. 93 Cotton
appealed his conviction. 94 On appeal, Cotton contended that the record
lacked sufficient evidence to support the charges of criminal solicitation
because Cotton's wife never received the letters. 9 Thus, the question
presented to the court of appeals was whether the record contained proper
evidence sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt each element
of criminal solicitation.96 The court of appeals held that evidence of
criminal solicitation is not sufficient when the intended solicitation is not
in fact communicated.97 The offense of solicitation is incomplete in cases

where the solicitation is not communicated. 9
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals noted that the criminal
solicitation statute in New Mexico adopts, in part, the Model Penal Code
definition of the crime of solicitation." The court of appeals relied on
the New Mexico Legislature's failure to enact the portion of the Model
Penal Code making uncommunicated solicitations a crime.'0 The court

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.

90. The criminal solicitation statute states:
Except as to bona fide acts of persons authorized by law to investigate and detect
the commission of offenses by others, a person is guilty of criminal solicitation,
if with the intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a felony, he
solicits, commands, requests, induces, employs or otherwise attempts to promote
or facilitate another person to engage in conduct constituting a felony within or
without the state.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-28-3(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
91. Cotton, 109 N.M. at 770, 790 P.2d at 1051.
92. Id. Cotton did not mall the second letter before his release on ball. Id.
93. Id. at 770-71, 790 P.2d at 1051-52. The court directed a verdict in favor of Cotton on the
conspiracy charge. Id. at 771, 790 P.2d at 1052.
94. Id. at 770, 790 P.2d at 1051.
95. Id. at 771, 790 P.2d at 1052. The fact that these two letters were never mailed was not in
dispute at Cotton's trial on charges of criminal solicitation. Id.
96. Id. The elements of solicitation are:
I. The defendant intended that another person commit [name of felony];
2. The defendant [solicited] [commanded] [requested] [induced] [employed] the
other person to commit the crime;
3. This happened in New Mexico on or about the -day of , 19-.
N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIM. 14-2817.
97. Cotton, 109 N.M. at 774, 790 P.2d at 1055.
98. Id.

99. Id. at 771-72, 790 P.2d at 1052-53.
100. Id. at 772, 790 P.2d at 1053.
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of appeals determined that the legislature's omission of that portion of
the Model Penal Code's definition indicated an implicit legislative determination that the offense of solicitation requires some form of actual
communication between the defendant and either an intermediary or the
person intended to be solicited concerning the subject matter of the
solicitation.'10
In addition, the court explained the statute's language "or otherwise
attempts to promote or facilitate another person to engage in conduct
constituting a felony."' 0 2 The court did not read the statute so broadly
that an attempt to commit criminal solicitation in fact constitutes criminal
solicitation.0 3 Rather, the court noted that a charge of attempted criminal
solicitation might be appropriate where the intended solicitation is not
communicated to an intermediary or a solicitee.'10 The crime of solicitation
does not include attempted solicitation because solicitation and attempt
have distinct elements. 0 5 Attempt requires proof of an intent to commit
an offense, plus proof of an act in furtherance of the offense.0 6 Solicitation, however, is complete whether or not overt steps are ever taken
toward completing the offense being solicited. 0 7
3. Forgery
New Mexico courts have construed the forgery statute °8 on several
occasions in the past. In State v. Tooke,'09 the court of appeals interpreted
"issuing" or "transferring" a forged writing to include the voluntary
transfer of such a writing to someone who acquires a legal interest in
the forged writing." 0 Under the facts of State v. Tooke, Tooke delivered
a forged check to an "okayer," who called a check verification service
before approving the check."' The court concluded that transfer of the
check to the "okayer" did not pass a legal interest." 2 Therefore, Tooke
could not properly be charged with forgery, but he could be charged
and convicted of attempted forgery." 3

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id. at 773-74, 790 P.2d at 1054-55.
Id. at 773, 790 P.2d at 1054.
Id. at 774, 790 P.2d at 1055.
Id.
Id. at 773-74, 790 P.2d at 1054-55.
Id.at 774, 790 P.2d at 1055.
Forgery consists of:
A. falsely making or altering any signature to, or any part of, any writing purporting
to have any legal efficacy with intent to injure or defraud; or
B. knowingly issuing or transferring a forged writing with intent to injure or
defraud.
Whoever commits forgery is guilty of a third degree felony.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-10 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
109. 81 N.M. 618, 471 P.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1970), overruled, State v. Ruffins, 109 N.M. 688,
789 P.2d 616 (1990).
110. Id. at 619, 471 P.2d at 189.
111. Id. at 618, 471 P.2d at 188.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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Seven years later, the court of appeals decided State v. Linam,"4 in
which the facts were similar to those of State v. Tooke. Linam handed
a forged check to a bank teller to be cashed." 5 The teller took the check
to her supervisor." 6 After Linam's conviction for forgery, he contended
on appeal that the evidence only supported a conviction for attempted
forgery because the facts in his case were not distinguishable from the
facts in State v. Tooke. 17 The court of appeals held that, in Linam's
case, an interest passed to the teller because the teller had immediate
authority to cash the check." '8 Thus, Linam could properly be convicted
of forgery."9
The supreme court resolved the debate over forgery versus attempted
forgery in State v. Ruffins.' 20 On December 18, 1986, Martha Ruffins
stole Pauline Halley's purse.' 2' Halley reported the incident to the police. 122
The next day, Ruffins attempted to use a check from Halley's checkbook
to pay for gas and food at a truck stop. 23 The two-party check was
made payable to Ruffins and signed "Mrs. Pauline Halley."'' 24 The cashier
refused to accept the check. 25
Ruffins was charged with forgery and larceny. 26 At trial, the jury
convicted Ruffins of the forgery charge. 27 Ruffins appealed the forgery
conviction to the court of appeals. Ruffins contended that her acts
constituted only attempted forgery and that the state's failure to produce
the forged check prevented a conviction for forgery. 128 The New Mexico
Court of Appeals certified the case to the New Mexico Supreme Court
for a determination of the requirements of the crime of forgery. 29
The supreme court first listed three methods of accomplishing forgery:
(1)falsely making or altering a writing purporting to have legal efficacy;
(2) physically delivering a forged writing; or (3) passing an interest in a
forged writing. 30 In Ruffins, the court examined the relationship between
the last two methods of committing forgery.' 3 '
Physical delivery alone is enough to constitute the transfer of a forged
instrument.13 2 No requirement exists that an interest in the instrument
114. 90 N.M. 729, 568 P.2d 255 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977),
overruled, State v. Ruffins, 109 N.M. 688, 789 P.2d 616 (1990).
115. Id. at 730, 568 P.2d at 256.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 109 N.M. 668, 789 P.2d 616 (1990).
121. Id. at 669, 789 P.2d at 617.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. Presumably, Ruffins took the check with her when she left the truck stop. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. The jury acquitted Ruffins of the larceny charge. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 670, 789 P.2d at 618.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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pass if there is physical delivery of the forged instrument. 3 3 A defendant
issues a forged writing when he knowingly physically delivers the false
instrument, offers the false instrument, or otherwise makes the false
instrument available for action.' 3 4 A defendant transfers a forged writing
when he knowingly conveys an interest in the false instrument.' 3 These
definitions served as the basis37 for the court's overruling of State v.
Tooke'316 and State v. Linam.1
Finally, the court concluded that acceptance of a forged instrument is
not an element of the crime of forgery. 38 Acceptance is not necessary
because, even if an individual refuses to accept a forged instrument, the
39
forger nevertheless offered the instrument as a genuine instrument.
Thus, the court upheld Ruffins' conviction for forgery.' 40
III.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN DWI CASES

During the survey period, New Mexico appellate courts addressed several
cases involving drunk drivers. These cases raised issues requiring the
courts to interpret the Fresh Pursuit Act 14' and the Implied Consent
Act. 42 The courts also addressed when a minor has the right to a jury
trial 43 and whether the trial court is required to impound vehicles involved
in DWI's.'4
A.

Fresh Pursuit
The New Mexico Supreme Court interpreted the Fresh Pursuit Act 4
("FPA") twice during the survey period.'4 The FPA permits a police
officer to continue his pursuit of a suspect outside of the officer's
jurisdiction if the suspect has allegedly committed a misdemeanor in the

133. Id. The court of appeals' earlier opinions incorrectly required a passing of an interest in
addition to physical delivery. Id. at 670-71, 789 P.2d at 618-19.
134. Id. at 671, 789 P.2d at 619.
135. Id.
136. 81 N.M. 618, 471 P.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1970), overruled, State v. Ruffins, 109 N.M. 688,
789 P.2d 616 (1990); see supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
137. 90 N.M. 729, 568 P.2d 255 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977),
overruled, State v. Ruffins, 109 N.M. 688, 789 P.2d 616 (1990); see supra notes 114-19 and
accompanying text.
138. Ruffins, 109 N.M. at 671, 789 P.2d at 619. The court overruled State v. Lopez, 81 N.M.
107, 464 P.2d 23 (Ct. App. 1969), cert. denied, 81 N.M. 140, 464 P.2d 559 (1970), to the extent
that State v. Lopez suggested that acceptance is a necessary element of the crime of forgery. Ruffins,
109 N.M. at 671, 789 P.2d at 619.
139. Ruffins, 109 N.M. at 671, 789 P.2d at 619.
140. Id. Because Ruffins' actions fulfilled the requirements for the completed crime of forgery,
she was not entitled to a jury instruction for attempted forgery. Id.
141. See infra notes 145-71 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 172-87 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 188-208 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 209-21 and accompanying text.
145. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-2-1 to -8 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
146. See County of Los Alamos v. Tapia, 109 N.M. 736, 790 P.2d 1017 (1990); Incorporated
County of Los Alamos v. Johnson, 108 N.M. 633, 776 P.2d 1252 (1989).
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presence of the pursuing officer. 47 Early in the survey period, the supreme
court failed to explicitly define "misdemeanor" in the FPA to include

petty misdemeanors.

4

Ten months later, the court explicitly extended

' 49
the term "misdemeanor" in the FPA to include "petty misdemeanors."'
The facts and the questions presented to the supreme court in Incorporated County of Los Alamos v. Johnson150 and County of Los Alamos

v. Tapia 51 were remarkably similar. 5 2 In both Tapia and Johnson, a
police officer observed a person driving a car in an erratic manner."'5 4

The police officer in each case began his pursuit in Los Alamos County.'1
Neither driver stopped his vehicle until he entered Santa Fe County.'
Each driver was arrested, charged, and convicted by the Los Alamos
Municipal Court of driving while intoxicated ("DWI") 5 6 Tapia's case
differed from Johnson's case in one respect. The trial court in Tapia
found that the police officer who stopped Tapia did not have reasonable
grounds to believe that Tapia was intoxicated. 5 7 Instead, the police officer
in Tapia had only a reasonable suspicion to stop Tapia for running 5a8
stop sign and operating his motor vehicle with an inoperative tail light.
In Johnson, the police officer observed Johnson driving in an erratic
manner, which constituted reasonable grounds for the officer to believe
Johnson was intoxicated.1 9 Thus, the Tapia court had to determine
whether the FPA applied to a person whom the police officer suspected
of running a stop sign and driving with an inoperative tail light. ' 6 The
Johnson court, conversely, had to determine 16whether the FPA applied
to fresh pursuit of a suspected drunk driver.'

147. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-2-8 (Repl. Pamp. 1984). Section 31-2-8 states:
A. Any county sheriff or municipal police officer who leaves his jurisdictional
boundary while in fresh pursuit of a misdemeanant whom he would otherwise have
authority to arrest shall have the authority to arrest that misdemeanant anywhere
within this state and return him to the jurisdiction in which the fresh pursuit began
without further judicial process.
B. For purposes of this section, "fresh pursuit of a misdemeanant" means the
pursuit of a person who has committed a misdemeanor in the presence of the
pursuing officer. Fresh pursuit shall not necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit
without unreasonable delay.
148. Johnson, 108 N.M. at 634-35, 776 P.2d at 1253-54. But see id. at 635, 776 P.2d at 1254
(Baca, J., specially concurring).
149. Tapia, 109 N.M. at 745, 790 P.2d at 1026.
150. 108 N.M. 633, 776 P.2d 1252 (1989).
151. 109 N.M. 736, 790 P.2d 1017 (1990).
152. Compare id. at 737-38, 790 P.2d at 1018-19 with Johnson, 108 N.M. at 634-35, 776 P.2d
at 1253-54.
153. Tapia, 109 N.M. at 737-38, 790 P.2d at 1018-19; Johnson, 108 N.M. at 633, 776 P.2d at
1252.
154. Tapia, 109 N.M. at 737-38, 790 P.2d at 1018-19; Johnson, 108 N.M. at 633, 776 P.2d at
1252.
155. Tapia, 109 N.M. at 737-38, 790 P.2d at 1018-19; Johnson, 108 N.M. at 633, 776 P.2d at
1252.
156. Tapia, 109 N.M. at 738, 790 P.2d at 1019; Johnson, 108 N.M. at 633, 776 P.2d at 1252.
157. Tapia, 109 N.M. at 745, 790 P.2d at 1026.
158. Id.
159. Johnson, 108 N.M. at 633, 776 P.2d at 1252.
160. Tapia, 109 N.M. at 745, 790 P.2d at 1026.
161. Id.
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The alleged offenses in Tapia and Johnson were materially different
because a person convicted of DWI for the first time is a petty misdemeanant, a person convicted of subsequent DWI's is a misdemeanant, 62
and a person convicted of running a stop sign and driving with an
inoperative tail light is always a petty misdemeanant 63 Therefore, the
police officer chasing Johnson had no way of knowing whether Johnson
had violated a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor statute.'6
Although the Johnson court rejected Johnson's reading of the FPA
to exclude petty misdemeanors, the court found that the FPA authorized
the police officer to pursue Johnson into Santa Fe County. 65 Yet, the
Johnson court did not explicitly find that the term "misdemeanor"
included petty misdemeanors. '6 Rather, the court interpreted the FPA
to allow extraterritorial arrests when a police officer has no way of
knowing whether the suspect allegedly violated a misdemeanor or petty
misdemeanor statute. 67
Justice Baca wrote a specially concurring opinion in Johnson in which
he stated he would not have simply found an exception to the FPA for
situations falling within the facts of Johnson. Instead, Justice Baca would
have defined "the generic term 'misdemeanor'
to include petty misdemeanors for purposes of the FPA.'6 Justice Ransom joined Justice
Baca's special concurrence. Ten months later, when the supreme court
heard Tapia, Justices Baca and Ransom convinced Chief Justice Sosa of
their position. 69 In Tapia, the supreme court adopted Baca's definition
of misdemeanor and found that the arrest outside of the officer's jurisdiction for running a stop sign and driving with an inoperative tail
light was valid. 70 Thus, currently, a county sheriff or municipal police
officer may chase a suspected petty misdemeanant outside of the officer's
jurisdiction if the pursuit began within the boundaries of the officer's

jurisdiction. 171
B.

Implied Consent
The court of appeals heard a DWI case in which the issue was whether
the Implied Consent Act 72 governs the administration of a blood-alcohol

162. Johnson, 108 N.M. at 635, 776 P.2d at 1254.
163.

Tapia, 109 N.M. at 745, 790 P.2d at 1026.

164. Johnson, 108 N.M. at 635, 776 P.2d at 1254.
165. Id.

166. Id. at 633, 776 P.2d at 1252; see also Tapia, 109 N.M. at 745, 790 P.2d at 1026.
167. Johnson, 108 N.M. at 633, 776 P.2d at 1252.
168. See id. at 635, 776 P.2d at 1254 (Baca, J., specially concurring).
169. See Tapia, 109 N.M. at 745, 790 P.2d at 1026. It is interesting to note that in Johnson,
Chief Justice Sosa's dissenting opinion adopted Judge Alarid's court of appeals opinion that construed
section 31-2-8 of the FPA as prohibiting fresh pursuit for petty misdemeanors, Johnson, 108 N.M.

at 636, 776 P.2d at 1255 (Sosa, C.J., dissenting), yet Chief Justice Sosa concurred with the majority
in Tapia, which explicitly stated that the FPA allows extraterritorial arrests of suspected petty
misdemeanants. Tapia, 109 N.M. at 745, 790 P.2d at 1026.
170. Tapia, 109 N.M. at 745, 790 P.2d at 1026.

171. Id.
172. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-8-105 to -112 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
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test when the test is administered solely for medical reasons.' The Implied
Consent Act states that any person who drives a motor vehicle in New
Mexico automatically consents to a breath or a blood test to determine
whether that person has been driving while under the influence of drugs
or alcohol. 7 4 The Implied Consent Act, however, also provides that if
a person is arrested for suspicion of DWI and refuses to submit to a
blood test, a police officer must obtain a search warrant before compelling
the suspect to submit to the test.' 75
In State v. Johnston, 76 Johnston was taken to an emergency room
with head injuries sustained in a traffic accident. 7 7 An emergency room
physician noticed the odor of alcohol emanating from Johnston and
ordered that a blood-alcohol test be performed by the hospital laboratory
as part of Johnston's treatment.' 78 The hospital staff took the blood
sample solely for medical purposes and drew the blood before the deoffendant's arrest. 79 Subsequently, at the request of law enforcement
80
ficials, a hospital employee took another blood sample.
At trial, the district court suppressed the results of the test ordered
by law enforcement officials.' 8' The state then attempted to introduce
the results of the first blood test as proof of defendant's intoxication
at the time of the accident.8 2 The trial court also suppressed the results
of the first blood test because the court believed that admitting the results
would circumvent the Implied Consent Act. 83
On appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial court erroneously
suppressed the results of the hospital's blood test. 8 4 Following the lead
of several other states' courts, the court of appeals explained that implied
consent statutes normally do not apply to blood tests taken strictly for
medical reasons. 185 The court then concluded that the New Mexico Implied
Consent Act's scheme was similar to that of other states' Implied Consent
Acts in that New Mexico's Act only requires that a search warrant be

173. See State v. Johnston, 108 N.M. 778, 779 P.2d 556 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M.
771, 779 P.2d 549 (1989).
174. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-107(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
175. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-111(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
176. 108 N.M. 778, 779 P.2d 556 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 771, 779 P.2d 549 (1989).
177. Id. at 779, 779 P.2d at 557.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.The trial court found that Johnston refused to submit to a second blood test. Notwithstanding Johnston's refusal, the police officer ordered that the hospital take another blood
sample. Because the court did not issue a search warrant authorizing the second blood test, the
trial court suppressed the results of that test. Record at 110-11.
182. Johnston, 108 N.M. at 779, 779 P.2d at 557.
183. Id. Section 66-8-111(A) of the Implied Consent Act provides that "[i]f a person under arrest
for [DWI] refuses upon request of a law enforcement officer to submit to chemical tests designated
by [the Implied Consent Act], none shall be administered except when a municipal judge, magistrate,
or district judge issues a search warrant authorizing chemical tests as provided .... " The district
court judge reasoned that allowing the results of the first blood test into evidence would effectively
render meaningless a defendant's right to refuse a blood test. Record at 117, 124.
184. Johnston, 108 N.M. at 780-81, 779 P.2d at 558-59.
185. Id. at 780, 779 P.2d at 558.
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obtained for blood tests taken at the direction of law enforcement officials. 8 6 Because the medically administered blood test did not violate
the Implied Consent Act, the court reversed the trial court's order suppressing the results of the first test performed by the hospital's laboratory.' 87
C. Right to a Jury Trial for a Minor Charged with D WI
The United States and New Mexico Constitutions guarantee a jury trial
for criminal proceedings. 88 In federal juvenile proceedings, the right to
a jury trial is not constitutionally required.8 9 The New Mexico Constitution, however, secures the right to a jury trial in all cases that, at the
time of the state constitution's adoption, required a jury trial.' 9° When
New Mexico adopted its constitution, juveniles were treated the same as
adults for the purposes of determining whether a jury trial was in order.' 9'
Further, the New Mexico Children's Code presently provides that a
juvenile is entitled to a jury trial when an adult is so entitled under the
same circumstances. 92 In 1977, the court of appeals interpreted the
Children's Code as providing a minor defendant the right to a jury trial
when the offense, if committed by an adult, would be triable in district
court. 193
In light of this background, the court of appeals had to decide whether
a minor charged with two petty misdemeanors was entitled to a jury

186. Id.
187. Id. at 780-81, 779 P.2d at 558-59.
188. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 12.
189. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 776, 568 P.2d 612
(Ct. App. 1977). The Doe court explained that although neither the sixth nor the seventh amendment
of the United States Constitution requires that a juvenile be given a jury trial whenever an adult
would be so entitled, "states may require stricter constitutional standards" as New Mexico has after
its enactment of the Children's Code. Id. at 777, 568 P.2d at 613 (citations omitted).
190. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 12. The constitution states that "[tihe right of trial by jury as it
has heretofore existed shall be secured to all and remain inviolate." Id. (emphasis added); see
Guiterrez v. Gober, 43 N.M. 146, 148, 87 P.2d 437, 438 (1939) (the "as it has heretofore existed"
clause refers to the right to a jury trial "as it existed in the territory of New Mexico at the time
immediately preceding the adoption of the [New Mexico] Constitution").
191. See Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 723, 437 P.2d 716, 722 (1968); Doe, 90 N.M. at 777,
568 P.2d at 613.
192. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-31(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). The statute provides in pertinent part
that "[a] jury trial on the issues of alleged delinquent acts may be demanded by the child ...
when the offense alleged would be triable by jury if committed by an adult ..
" Id. But, even
adults are not entitled to a jury trial under all circumstances. For example, an adult tried in
metropolitan court for an offense which carries a penalty that does not exceed 90 days imprisonment
is entitled to a bench trial only. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-8A-5(B)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
193. Doe, 90 N.M. at 777, 568 P.2d at 613. In Doe, the minor defendant was charged with
receiving stolen property. Id. Had an adult committed that offense, the magistrate court would
have had jurisdiction. Id. All cases tried in magistrate court, except for contempt of the magistrate
court, are triable by a jury. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 35-8-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1988); see also N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 36-10-1 (1953, 2d Repl. Vol. 6, 1972, Supp. 1975) (also true for magistrate court proceedings
when the court of appeals decided Doe). Thus, if the court had held that a juvenile was entitled
to a jury trial whenever an adult would be entitled to a jury trial in magistrate court, juveniles
would always be entitled to a jury trial. The Doe court rejected this reading of the Children's Code
because such a holding would render the phrase "when the offense alleged would be triable by
jury if committed by an adult . . ." superfluous. Doe, 90 N.M. at 777, 568 P.2d at 613.
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trial. In State v. Benjamin C.,' 94 a minor defendant was charged with
DWI and with allowing himself to be served alcohol. 95 The defendant
requested a jury trial in a timely manner.'9 The trial court determined
the minor defendant had no right to a jury trial.197 The defendant appealed
after the judge convicted him of the two crimes. 98
The state, and apparently the trial court, relied on the court of appeals'
earlier holding in State v. Doe'99 that a juvenile is entitled to a jury trial
when the state alleges that the juvenile committed a district court offense . 2
The Doe court restricted a juvenile's jury trial right to district court
offenses. The court reasoned that if the statutory provision mandating
a jury trial for juveniles "when the offense alleged would be triable by
jury if committed by an adult" was interpreted to mean magistrate court
offenses, then juveniles would be entitled to a jury trial in all cases. 20'
Because the juvenile defendant in Benjamin C. was charged with two
petty misdemeanors, neither of which were by definition "district court
offenses," the trial court denied the defendant's motion for a jury trial. 20 2
On appeal, the Benjamin C. court explained that the state's analysis
was faulty because the state failed to focus on the "totality of the
offenses charged against the child. ' 20 3 The court applied the procedure
the supreme court adopted in Vallejos v. Barnhart2°4 concerning adults
charged with multiple offenses. 205 In Vallejos, the supreme court determined that adult defendants were entitled to a jury trial when the aggregate
penalty for all offenses charged exceeded six months. 206 The aggregate
penalty for the two offenses charged against Benjamin C. exceeded six
months. 207 Thus, the court concluded that the minor in this case was
entitled to a jury trial. 2°s
D. Judicial Discretion to Impound Vehicles Implicated in DWI Cases
In another DWI-related case, the court of appeals decided whether the
statute that imposes penalties for DWI offenders mandates that state

194. 109 N.M.
195. Id. at 70,
(B), -1.1 (Repl.
196. Benjamin

67, 781 P.2d 795 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 54, 781 P.2d 782 (1989).
781 P.2d at 798; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-8-102 (Supp. 1988), 60-7BPamp. 1987).
C., 109 N.M. at 68, 781 P.2d at 796.

197. Id.
198. Id.
199. 90 N.M. 776, 568 P.2d 612 (Ct. App. 1977).
200. See Benjamin C., 109 N.M. at 70-71, 781 P.2d at 798-99.

201. Doe, 90 N.M. at 777, 568 P.2d at 613; see supra note 193.
202. Benjamin C., 109 N.M. at 70, 781 P.2d at 798.
203. Id.
204. 102 N.M. 438, 697 P.2d 121 (1985).
205. Benjamin C., 109 N.M. at 70-71, 781 P.2d at 798-99.
206. Vallejos, 102 N.M. at 438, 697 P.2d at 121. Under New Mexico law, a criminal defendant

may request a jury trial when "the penalty exceeds ninety days' [sic] but does not exceed six months
imprisonment." A criminal defendant is entitled to a jury trial, absent acceptable waiver, when
"the penalty exceeds six months' imprisonment." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-8A-5(B)(2) to -5(B)(3)
(Repl. Pamp. 1990). Additionally, in State v. (Jesus) Sanchez, 109 N.M. 428, 429, 786 P.2d 42,
43 (1990), the supreme court held that an "objective measure of the combined, maximum statutory
penalties [rather than a] subjective measure of the actual penalty threatened at the commencement
of trial" should be used to determine whether a defendant is entitled to a jury trial.
207. Benjamin C., 109 N.M. at 71, 781 P.2d at 799.
208. Id.
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trial courts impound a second-time DWI offender's automobile. 2°9 In

State v. Barber,10 the defendant pled guilty to a second offense of
DWI. 211 The defendant owned the car he was driving when he was stopped,
and he still owned it when he pled guilty to the offense. 21 2 Although the
state proved all of the statutory elements required before an automobile
can be impounded, the magistrate court denied the state's motion to
impound the defendant's car. 213 The district court dismissed the state's
original appeal of the motion to impound; 214 the state then appealed the
district court's dismissal of its appeal. 2 5 The state contended that the

impoundment was mandatory if all the statutory elements were proven. 216
On appeal, the court of appeals began its analysis by looking at the
wording of the statute. 217 The court first acknowledged that the use of
generally designates mandatory action. 21 1

the word "shall" in a statute
The court then compared the statutory section concerning the impounding
of a vehicle to the statutory section imposing imprisonment upon conviction of DWI. The court noted that the legislature passed both sections
concurrently. 21 9 The court then noted that the legislature included language
in the imprisonment section which clearly precluded judicial intervention
in imprisonment, but did not include any such language in the impoundment section. 220 Because such "mandatory" language was not present in
the impoundment section, the court concluded that the legislature did
209. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(I) (Supp. 1990). The statute provides:
I. In addition to any other penalties imposed by this section, if a person is
convicted for the second time under this section, the motor vehicle he was driving
at the time of the offense, if the convicted person was an owner of the motor
vehicle at the time of the offense, shall be impounded or immobilized by an
immobilization device at the convicted person's expense for thirty days....
Id. (emphasis added).
210. 108 N.M. 709, 778 P.2d 456 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 713, 778 P.2d 911 (1989).
211. Id. at 710, 778 P.2d at 457.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. The district court found that the state had no right to appeal the magistrate's decision. The
court based its finding on: (1) double jeopardy grounds; (2) N.M. STAT. ANN. § 35-13-1, which
only gives a criminal defendant (not the prosecution) the right to appeal a magistrate's findings to
the district court; and (3) the belief that section 66-8-102(1) was discretionary.
215. Barber, 108 N.M. at 710, 778 P.2d at 457.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 711, 778 P.2d at 458.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(I) (Supp. 1988) with § 66-8-102(E)(1), (E)(2).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(E) states in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary for suspension or deferment
of execution of a sentence:
(1) upon a second or third conviction occurring within five years of a prior
conviction, each offender shall be sentenced to a jail term of not less than fortyeight consecutive hours which shall not be suspended or deferred or taken under
advisement; and
(2) upon a fourth or subsequent conviction, each offender shall be sentenced to
a jail term of not less than six months which shall not be suspended or deferred
or taken under advisement.
(Emphasis added.) The language that prevents a court from suspending or deferring a sentence in
these cases is not in the impoundment section of the statute.
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not intend to remove judicial discretion in the case of vehicle impoundment
after a second DWI conviction. 22' In other words, because the statute
does not make impoundment mandatory, courts have discretion with
respect to the impoundment of vehicles used to commit DWI.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This survey has discussed the relevant legal issues and judicial interpretations of criminal statutes in New Mexico for the survey period
commencing in August 1989 and culminating in July 1990. After extensive
review, the authors have provided a synopsis of the pertinent cases that
have affected criminal law in New Mexico. This survey has provided
those cases in a framework that is helpful to legal practitioners, law
students and lay persons.
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221. Barber, 108 N.M. at 711, 778 P.2d at 458.

